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1 Introduction
Unemployment has been high in many European countries for now more than
thirty years. At the same time it has reached very low levels in the Unites States,
and furthermore growth has been faster there since 1995. These developments
have brought about a sense of ‘decline’ in many European countries and one
may ask whether Europe will eventually solve its unemployment problem and
converge again to the US, or whether the divergence will continue and relegate
Europe in a lower category.
This paper takes a look at the evolution of unemployment and labor mar-
ket institutions in European countries. A key finding (section 2) is that of
divergence within Europe, where some countries have managed to reduce un-
employment substantially, while others seem to be stuck at high unemployment
levels. There is some evidence that the countries who got out of the unem-
ployment problem implemented a number of labor market reforms. The other
countries have followed a more contradictory path, having sometimes ‘positive’
reforms and sometimes ‘negative’ ones. In section 3 I look at alternative, quan-
titative measures of competition in labor markets. While these measures do
∗This paper was prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives. I am grateful to
Olivier Blanchard for useful comments.
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not match the observed evolutions of unemployment and labor market regula-
tions – which suggests there may be problems with the data or with the true
impact of these reforms –they do not provide grounds for optimism in those
countries that still experience high unemployment, with the potential exception
of Italy. I then discuss — section 4 — how the political economy approach may
offer some insight about potential obstacles to labor market flexibility, and how
political support against reforms may be sustained by, and reinforce as well,
ideologies and views of the economy that run against useful reforms. In section
5, some perspectives are offered about how to explain which countries were suc-
cessful and which were not, although there are more research directions than
firm conclusions. Section 6 concludes.
2 What have we learned?
2.1 Basic facts
Unemployment had been historically very low in most European countries dur-
ing the sixties. However, it rose sharply in the early seventies, and in many
countries has not fallen back to its previous level (Table 1).
While unemployment increased everywhere in the early seventies, since the
mid-eighties there has been a diverging pattern. Countries can be split between
those that apparently managed to reduce their unemployment rates back to a
low level, and those where it remains high and persistent. These includes, in
particular, the three largest continental economies, France, Italy, and Germany.
As for Spain, unemployment has fallen sharply in recent years, but that was
from a pathologically high level, and it remains higher there than in most other
European countries, and certainly much higher than in 1970. The only big
country that seems to have escaped from persistent long-term unemployment
is the UK. Unemployment seems to have fallen in a number of other small
countries: Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Portugal. Scandinavian
countries escaped the rise in unemployment of the seventies, but experienced
2
a sharp increase in the nineties, due to external macroeconomic shocks. Since
then, unemployment has fallen back to secular low levels in Norway and Sweden,
but not Finland.
The individual experience is therefore quite diverse, and in some sense one
may no longer talk of a common European unemployment problem. One should
also point out that this divergence cannot be explained by cross-country differ-
ences in the definition of unemployment or in the use of disguised unemployment
schemes such as (some) active labor market policies, pre-retirement, and so on.
For example, France has a high unemployment rate but also one of the high-
est fraction of the workforce in relief jobs or early retirement, and the lowest
work week for full-time employed workers.1 Spain has a high unemployment
rate and also a very low participation rate. The popular view that a lot of
unemployment in the Netherlands is hidden as disability is not inaccurate, but
it does not explain the fall in unemployment there: the fraction of workers on
disability benefits has also fallen. Also, the correlation across countries between
unemployment and participation in 2000 was -0.5, so countries with high unem-
ployment tend to have lower participation. And the cross-country correlation
between hours worked per employee and unemployment is essentially zero.2
1See for example, OECD Labor force statistics (2003)
2These correlations were computed using the OECD Economic outlook database.
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Unemployment rate
Country 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000
Austria 1.6 1.6 4.7 5.9 5.8
Belgium 1.9 7.9 8.7 12.9 10.6
Denmark 1.3 6.9 9.4 10.2 5.8
Finland 1.9 4.7 3.2 15.4 9.1
France 2.5 6.2 8.9 11.6 10.3
Germany 0.6 3.2 6.2 8.1 8.7
Greece 4.2 2.8 7.0 10.0 10.9
Ireland 5.6 7.0 12.9 12.2 5.0
Italy 4.0 5.6 9.1 11.7 11.2
Netherlands 0.9 4.0 6.0 7.1 3.2
Norway 1.4 1.7 5.2 4.9 3.8
Portugal 5.8 9.5 4.7 7.2 4.3
Spain 2.7 10.9 15.7 22.7 14.0
Sweden 1.5 2.0 1.7 7.7 4.5
United Kingdom 2.4 6.1 5.9 8.6 6.0
Table 1 — The evolution of unemployment rates in the European Union
At the beginning of the current century, therefore, Europe can be split into
two clubs: a low-unemployment club, which includes Austria, Denmark, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, and a high-unemployment club, made of Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, and Spain.
2.2 Potential explanations
This divergence among European countries that occurred in the nineties — with
some countries being able to reduce their unemployment rate at remarkably
low levels and others being stuck at high levels — is potentially a quite useful
experiment if one wants to know the underlying causes of unemployment. If
there is something that these countries did and others did not, then there is a
presumption that one has uncovered a cause of unemployment.
When unemployment started to increase in the 1970s, at that time it was
widely believed that the increase was due to the first oil shock, an adverse ag-
gregate supply shock (see Bruno and Sachs (1985)). Then came the second oil
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shock, contractionary monetary policies in the eighties, so that at each point
in time there was an ”immediate cause” that could be formulated in terms of
short-run fluctuations. Yet in the longer run unemployment failed to return to
its initial level even though the oil shocks have been almost entirely offset and
nominal prices should adjust to bring unemployment back to its equilibrium level
Therefore, some sort of consensus emerged that high unemployment in Europe
was in fact due to labor market rigidities, in other words to a higher equilib-
rium rate than in the sixties. These rigidities consist of a set of institutions
that increase the equilibrium rate of unemployment by boosting the incumbent
employee’s bargaining power in wage setting (such as minimum wages, work
rules or employment protection), or their fallback options (such as the level
and duration of unemployment benefits and other welfare payments). Standard
theory states that in order to offset these factors and to bring back wages to a
level compatible with productivity, the equilibrium rate of unemployment must
go up3.
In order to be valid, this hypothesis must pass two tests. First, is there
a sense in which rigidities have increased or become more relevant during the
high unemployment period as compared to the sixties? Second, does it help
to understand the subsequent divergence? My answer to both questions is a
qualified yes.
A recent paper by Nickell (2003) provides a concise and synthetic assessment
of the evolution of labor market institutions in Europe and their impact on
unemployment. It shows that:
(i) In most countries, labor market are more rigid now, along a number of
dimensions, than in the sixties, suggesting that the unemployment problem is
unlikely to go away by itself.
(ii) Countries that managed to reduce unemployment in the nineties did so
by implementing some wage moderation mechanisms, often through a compre-
3See Layard et al. (1990) for an exposition.
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hensive reform package, i.e. progress was made on a number of aspects.
(iii) Countries that did not, did not implement significant reforms and have
kept rigid labor market institutions. Or, they increased flexibility along a few
dimensions but reduced it along many others.
Thus it is excessive, as some authors do, to claim that institutions are not
responsible for the rise in European Unemployment, because European labor
markets were already rigid in the sixties. In fact, a number of indices of labor
rigidity have gone up. The data in Nickell (2003) show a sharp increase in un-
employment benefits in virtually all European countries except the UK between
1960 and 1999; indices of employment protection legislation have gone up in
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.
They have fallen (but only slightly) in Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Spain. Finally, taxes on labor have gone up everywhere. Thus it is unlikely
that unemployment is only due to shocks and different persistent responses to
these shocks (See Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 for an analysis); at a minimum
these shocks should affect the political dynamics of institutions so as to per-
manently change them. It also contradicts the view that the rise in European
unemployment is entirely explained by a shift from a ”good” equilibrium to a
”bad” one under constant institutions. Such a shift is possible, but then the
”good” equilibrium itself is likely to have deteriorated.4
Going back to the divergence of the nineties, between 1980 and 2000, in
France, benefit duration lengthened, union coverage went up, coordination of
wage setting went down, and employment protection became stricter. In Italy,
the replacement rate went up, and so did labor taxes. In Germany, benefit
duration lengthened. In contrast, the Netherlands experienced an increase in the
strictness of unemployment benefit administration, better coordination in wage-
setting (the Wassenaar agreement), lower labor taxes and less strict employment
protection. The UK has a less clear pattern, since benefit duration went up,
4See for example Blanchard and Summers (1988), Saint-Paul (1995) for some theoretical
arguments.
6
but had many changes that went in the direction of lower unemployment: lower
replacement rates, stricter benefit administration, much reduced union coverage,
lower union density, lower labor taxes. Ireland experienced similar institutional
changes as the UK (Table 2). It is the country where unemployment has fallen
most rapidly in the second half of the nineties, and during that period, all
institutional indicators went in the direction of lower unemployment, except UB
duration, whose lengthening was probably innocuous (as in the UK) in light of
the sharp fall in average replacement rations, and employment protection, which
remained untouched.
Indicator 65-72 80-87 1988-95 2000
Unemployment rate 5.6 7.0 12.9 5.0
Unemployment benefits 24 50 40 35
UB Duration 0.78 0.4 0.39 0.77
Union density 51 56 51 43
Coordination in wage setting 2 2 2 3
Employment protection 0.19 0.5 0.5 0.5
Labour taxes 30 37 41 33
Table 2 — Institutional changes in Ireland (Source: Nickell (2003))
Therefore, the evidence supports the traditional view that rigidities that
reduce competition in labor markets are typically responsible for high unem-
ployment. Reducing these rigidities globally seems to work. But it is much
less clear how much would be gained, if anything, by increasing flexibility along
one dimension only. In other words, we are not sure how much unemployment
unions, or employment protection, or minimum wages are responsible for, but
we know that altogether they substantially increase it. That is probably due
to a lack of reliable data. But the evidence will not convince opponents of that
traditional view that it is valid, and should lead its partisans to advocate a
comprehensive reform package rather than a reform of a specific institution.
If one takes unemployment benefits, for example, there is a general ten-
dency for replacement ratios to fall during the nineties; but there is no sig-
nificant correlation across European countries between the extent of the fall
and the change unemployment: the correlation is indeed positive, as expected
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(+0.37) but not significant5. And, in a cross-section of countries, one observes
all possible cases: high unemployment/high benefits (Spain), high unemploy-
ment/low benefits (Italy), low unemployment/high benefits (Sweden), low un-
employment/low benefits (UK). This is somewhat paradoxical in light of the
theory, which predicts that the unemployment benefit replacement ratio is the
most robust determinant of equilibrium unemployment. What researchers have
found, though, is a significant positive association between benefit duration and
unemployment duration6. This could not be true, obviously, if benefit levels did
not matter too. It may simply be that numerous data problems (such as omitted
variables) are filtered out when one looks at unemployment duration vs. benefit
duration instead of levels.
Another intriguing aspect of the experience of the 1990s is that most of the
gains, in the low unemployment club, were realized during the expansionary
phase of the second half of the decade. During that period unemployment fell
everywhere but returned to the previous trough in the high unemployment club,
while it typically fell much below in the low unemployment club. From a layman
perspective, this seems to make sense: structural reform is useless if the jobs
are not there. But, from an economist’s perspective, that is much harder to
understand. First, we know that plenty of jobs are created during recessions7.
Second, we typically think that the relationship between labor market tightness
and wage (or inflationary) pressure is convex, so that the increase in labor
demand triggered by structural reforms should create more jobs in recessions
than in expansions.
3 Some more evidence: the evolution of rents
The preceding discussion suggests that countries that still experience high un-
employment have had timid, ”stop-and-go”, labor market reform strategies.
5Source: DICE database.
6 See for example Bean (1994).
7Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
8
However, looking at actual institutional changes has some shortcomings in such
cases. First, it may well be that the ”good” reforms outweigh the ”bad” ones
quantitatively. Second, product market deregulation has proceeded in all Euro-
pean countries and one may believe that it contributes to reducing worker rents
and the natural rate of unemployment (see Blanchard and Philippon (2003) for
a recent discussion), even in those countries that did not implement significant
labor market reforms. One may thus want to look at alternative measures of the
degree of competition in labor markets in Europe. For this reason, it may be
useful to pursue a different approach and look at direct quantitative measures
of the labor market’s competitiveness. This is what is attempted in Saint-Paul
(2004), who tries to measure labor market competitiveness by constructing in-
dices of the employed’s rent, i.e. the welfare difference between an employed
workers and a similar unemployed worker. The drawback of that approach is
that it does not tell us which reforms have been implemented; workers’ rents
may fall under a number of labor market reforms, product market reforms or
the sheer pressure of international competition. On the other hand, it gives us
an idea of the evolution of the true degree of competition in labor markets. It
avoids misclassifying a policy change or taking serious one which turns out to
have only second-order effects on actual labor market flexibility, or which, for
some reason, is not enforced.
To measure rents, Saint-Paul (2004) uses two different approaches. The first
one exploits variation across industries of wages. This empirical regularity has
been much studied in the eighties and nineties, under the impulse of Krueger
and Summers (1988). As argued by these authors, there are good reasons to
believe that these differentials capture worker rents. Therefore, we hope to
learn something about the evolution over time of labor market rents in a number
of European countries by looking at how the estimated coefficients of a wage
equation, in an individual data set, on industry dummies evolve. If rents are
falling over time, then we expect the dispersion in these coefficients across sectors
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to be falling too: In a rent-free economy, all of them would be equal to zero. In
a variant of that exercise, one may also look at wage differentials across firm size
categories instead of industries. The second approach, as in Cohen (1999) tries
to estimate a dynamic process for individual transitions between employment
and unemployment, and to use the estimated coefficients to compute the present
discounted value of being employed and the present discounted value of being
unemployed for any given category of worker. The difference between the two
gives us the total rent of the employed. That approach is less likely than the
other one to be biased by systematic sorting of workers with better unobservable
characteristics into high-wage sectors; on the other hand it is more vulnerable
to business cycles fluctuations.
Country Interindustry premium Size premium U/E differential Unemployment club
Denmark = = =- L
Netherlands = + =- L
Belgium = - - H
France = - =- H
Ireland - - - L
Italy = - =- H
Spain = = + H
Portugal = = + L
Austria + = - L
Finland += = - H
Table 3 — Evolution of different concepts of the employed’s rent in various
countries between 1994 and 2000
(Source: Saint-Paul, 2004)
Performing that exercise, we get mixed results, that are summarized in Ta-
ble 3: most coefficients do not fall over time, and therefore there is no robust
presumption that rents have fallen in the 1990s. There is no systematic as-
sociation between having falling rents according to a variety of measures and
being a member of the low unemployment club. Rents seem to have increased
in Portugal and Ireland, two low unemployment countries, and fallen in Italy,
a high unemployment one. On the other hand, the sharp fall in unemployment
in Ireland does seem to be associated with reduced rents.
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That lack of association between measured rents and the evolution of unem-
ployment may be due to several factors. First, there may simply exist long lags
between a reduction in rents and the induced fall in unemployment. Second,
wage pressure may be reduced, and so would equilibrium unemployment, if the
workers’ outside options in bargaining, rather than their rents, fall. That is
what a reduction of unemployment benefits typically achieves. Thus, rents do
not provide an overall picture, but they tell us something about the extent to
which insiders shelter themselves from competition with outsiders. This in turn
has relevance, as discussed in the next section, for long-term reform prospects:
reforms are easier if rents are smaller. Table 3 suggests that the only countries
where there are signs that rents have fallen are Ireland and Italy. If one takes
these arguments seriously, that would suggest that reforms could accelerate in
the future.
So, the findings do not generally confirm the evidence in the previous section.
That may be due to data problems or suggest that labor market reforms in a
number of countries (except Ireland) have not in fact increased competition in
labor markets. On the other hand, (except perhaps in Italy), there is no sign
of increased labor market competition in countries of the high unemployment
club, in contradiction with the view that it could be significantly affected by
developments outside the labor market, such as product market deregulation or
greater international capital mobility.
4 Obstacles to reform
Since a number of countries seem to have failed to implement labor market
reforms, one should discuss the obstacles to reform. This is what we do in this
section.
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4.1 Political economy
One key obstacle to labor market reform in Europe is that there exists powerful
constituencies of incumbent employees that may block reform. This is the phe-
nomenon I have analyzed in my previous work8. Such an approach may explain
why government have little incentives to implement the proper reforms in order
to fight unemployment.
4.1.1 The basic messages of the political economy approach
Essentially, political support for labor market rigidities will arise when a suf-
ficiently large fraction of the workforce earn rents, when these rents can be
enhanced by manipulating market outcomes through institutions, so as to re-
distribute in favor of the most powerful groups of workers (referred below as
"incumbent employees" or "insiders"), and when alternative, less distortionary
means of redistributions are not feasible (one reason being that to implement
them one might have to give transfers to some workers but not all, violating the
anonymity of public policy). Thus, we expect to observe labor market rigidi-
ties, the greater the effect of labor market regulations on wages, and the more
difficult or costly traditional redistributive tools are.
Alternatively, one may view these mechanisms as follows: Manipulating la-
bor market institutions by means of voting and lobbying activities is a way for
incumbent employees to circumvent the collective action problem and achieve
monopoly power at the economy-wide level. They achieve that at the expense
of other social groups. While many people tend to think of labour issues as a
conflict between labor and capital, international capital mobility implies that
capital adjusts very elastically to changes in its rate of return, so that labor mar-
ket rigidities only redistribute between capitalists and workers in the short run.
In the medium run, they redistribute between different categories of workers.
For example, wage rigidity would benefit employed ”unskilled”, or ”moderately
8See references at the end of the paper.
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skilled” workers, at the expense of skilled ones, a complementary input whose
marginal product falls when employment of less skilled workers is reduced.
Similarly, rigidities that have more effect on one sector than another may re-
distribute in favor of workers in that sector and at the expense of workers in
other sectors, by raising the relative price of that sector and then the wages of
its workers.
A number of key predictions of the political economy approach, as spelled
out in Saint-Paul (2000), are:
• Labor market institutions will be determined more by the interests of
employed workers than unemployed ones. Consequently, they will be de-
signed to achieve neither full employment nor social welfare. They will
imply more wage rigidity and more employment protection than socially
optimal9. Labor market reforms are politically viable only to the extent
that they are designed so as to preserve their interests.
• Role of economic environment: the gains and losses to the insiders from
labor market institutions depend on the economic environment. For ex-
ample, a greater elasticity of labor demand reduces the value to them of
institutions (such as work rules, etc.) which allow to improve their bar-
gaining position in the wage formation process. That is, when elasticity is
greater, regulation does a poorer job at increasing the wages of incumbent
employees — a given wage rise is more costly in terms of employment — and
there is less support for it (just like a monopoly would like to charge a
lower price). Greater exposure to unemployment increases the value to the
employed of reforms that boost job creation; conversely, if insiders are ex-
tremely sheltered from job loss, they will not gain from such reforms. The
9They may imply either more or less generous unemployment benefits than socially optimal,
depending on whether the insurance effects of unemployment benefits domnate their effects
on wage formation (See Saint-Paul, 2000, ch. 5). Note also that the socially optimal degree
of employment protection need not be zero if there exists microeconomic frictions in the labor
market and if there is a limited set of policy instruments to cope with them (See Saint-Paul,
2000, ch. 4).
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more exposed the employed, the more they take into account the interest
of the unemployed in their political decisions, since they have a greater
probability of becoming unemployed in the future. Greater inequality also
affects the political support for labor market institutions; for example it
may reduce the support for wage compression across workers of different
skills by making it too costly in terms of unemployment.10
• Status-quo bias: some labor market rigidities create their own constituency.
This leads to status-quo bias: an institution has more support if it already
exists than if it is yet to be put in place. One example is employment
protection: it maintains a number of workers in unproductive jobs that
would not exist absent employment protection. If employed workers earn
rents, an employed’s welfare is greater than a similar unemployed’s wel-
fare, those in these jobs will favor maintaining employment protection as
it is costly for them to lose their jobs.11Status-quo bias implies that there
may be path dependence in labor market regulations; path-dependence is
stronger, the greater the rents earned by incumbent employees.
• Politico-economic complementarities: the existence of one institution often
creates political support for another institution12. Employment protection
helps workers maintain their rents by reducing exposure to unemployment.
Assume there exists an institution that increases the wages of some cat-
egories of workers, and therefore creates rents for these workers. Then
the political support for employment protection is greater if that insti-
tution is present than if it is not. Conversely, if employment protection
exists, workers are less exposed to job loss. This makes them more likely
to support any institution which raises labor costs, for they are less likely
10See Saint-Paul (2000), ch.3.
11 See Saint-Paul (1997, 2000 ch.6, 2002).
12Complementarities may also arise from other economic mechanisms, see Orszag and
Snower (1998).
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to lose their jobs as a result.13Empirically, reform packages seem to have
been more efficient than isolated reforms. Countries that have managed
to reduce unemployment substantially, such as Britain or the Netherlands,
have implemented a number of reforms; in contrast, isolated reforms such
as the attempted reduction of minimum wages for youth in France in
1994, have often failed. This squares well with the view that there exists
politico-economic complementarities.
4.1.2 An illustration: reducing firing costs through temporary con-
tracts
A nice illustration of how political constraints shape labor market policy, is
the role of temporary contracts and similar marginal work arrangements, in
European reforms of employment protection legislation. Most of these reforms
have been done in a ”two-tier” fashion, by liberalizing the labor market at the
margin.14 Typical is the deregulation of the use of temporary contracts in Spain,
France, Italy, Portugal, and Germany. By leaving the insider’s employment
protection unchanged, the government can buy their political support for the
reform. Furthermore, it seems that these reforms typically take place at ”bad”
times when insiders are exposed to unemployment, i.e. at times when they
have more to gain from boosting job creation.15 These examples are illustrative
of how political constraints may shape reforms. In Saint-Paul (1993,2000), I
have argued that in addition to its political feasibility, two-tier reforms may
start political dynamics that are conducive to further reforms. Those who hold
flexible, or temporary contracts, have different interests from those who hold
rigid contracts, and if they become numerous enough, they can be used as a
13For example, the lower employment level brought about by that institution will only be
reached gradually as firms do not replace voluntary quits. See Saint-Paul (2000, ch.9) for an
analysis of politico-economic complementarities.
14These are analyzed in Saint-Paul (1993, 2000 ch. 8), from a political economy viewpoint.
Economic analysis of these reforms include Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Jimeno and To-
haria (1993), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and, more recently, Guell-Rottlan (2000), and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
15 Saint-Paul (1996).
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political constituency to implement further reforms. This is indeed what has
taken place to some extent in Spain, where, a few years after having been
introduced, temporary contracts accounted for one third of employment, and
reforms reducing employment protection for workers with permanent contracts
were implemented in the nineties, in exchange for further restrictions in the
use of temporary contracts. By contrast, in France, Italy, and Germany, where
temporary contracts are used to a lesser extent and account for only 10-15 % of
total employment, virtually no reform of employment protection for permanent
workers took place.
4.1.3 Can business-induced policies also harm employment?
That experience brings an interesting question: can political constraints lead
to reforms that are worse than no reforms? In the case of the two-tier sys-
tem of employment protection, a number of authors16 have argued that it may
be detrimental to employment and/or welfare, for example if it increases wage
pressure by reducing the exposure of employed workers with permanent con-
tracts, as workers with temporary contracts bear the burden of labor turnover.
While one may dispute these views, let us discuss its implications. Assume a
two-tier system of employment protection is indeed quite poor in terms of job
creation. Then, the benefits of such an arrangement would only be indirect, in
the form of the political support it generates for further reforms. But then, that
would suggest that countries where the number of temporary contracts is too
small to affect the balance of power should simply get rid of them, at least from
the point of view of reducing unemployment. Why would then such reforms
take place in the first place, except by mistake? In order to answer that, one
needs to point out that the main force opposing insiders in the political design
of labor market institutions is not the unemployed, who are unorganized and
command little political influence, but rather employers. Thus, the question can
16See Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2003).
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more fundamentally be reformulated as: can a reform be good for employers but
detrimental for net job creation?
One can think of whole classes of examples of such policies. We know from
the theoretical literature that a reduction if firing costs may reduce employ-
ment17; yet it unambiguously increases profits. Increases in total labor supply
through immigration or subsidies to young or female worker’s participation in
the labor market are unlikely to reduce equilibrium unemployment but would
benefit firms. In equilibrium, however, if firms freely compete to attract work-
ers, increased profitability is eventually dissipated in a higher outside option
for workers, i.e. higher welfare for the unemployed (see Saint-Paul 2000, ch. 2,
for a formal result along these lines). Consequently, there is an in-built conver-
gence of interests between the unemployed and firms as long as the latter freely
compete to hire workers. In places where product market regulation hampers
that mechanism, one may well see policies than benefit employers but not the
unemployed. Thus, greater product market deregulation may by itself have had
little impact so far, but it makes it more likely that labor market deregulation
has positive effects on employment.
4.2 Ideology
One factor that has been overlooked in the debate about European labor market
reform is the role of ideologies and representations about the functioning of the
economy in shaping our beliefs about what should be done. In particular, while
in the United States there is a well-defined ”mainstream” in economics, with
other approaches still existing but being marginalized, in a number of European
countries one still typically considers that there are many competing schools
that are equally worth. The combination of a given policymakers’ preferred
”school” and some emotional discourse about ”helping people” may lead to
wrong policies which will not cure unemployment. However, these policies are
17Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994).
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not uniformly mistaken and often benefit some interest groups. These interest
groups then gain from promoting the underlying ”school” or ideology regardless
of whether or not it is correct. Some examples may illustrate this point.
4.2.1 Examples of popular beliefs and who benefits from them
• The view that all unemployment is Keynesian and there is no such thing
as a long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment, or that such rate is zero
or very low, implies that the bulk of unemployment would eventually be
eliminated by traditional fiscal and monetary tools, and this underlines
much of the short-run Keynesian stimulation policies. Instead of recog-
nizing the failure of such policies, as exemplified by the case of Japan,
the advocates of such ideologies argue that macroeconomic stimulus has
not gone far enough. Ironically, this view can in, fact be accommodated
within mainstream economics: the ”hysteresis” literature provides mech-
anisms by which a temporary demand shock may permanently affect the
natural rate of unemployment (See Blanchard and Summers (1986); Got-
tfries and Horn (1987)). Yet, as argued by Layard et al. (1990), it is
unlikely that persistence mechanisms are strong enough to explain high
unemployment for 30 years. Incidentally, defenders of the ”100 % Keyne-
sian” view scarcely refer to these mechanisms.
• The idea that an increase in wages will help reduce unemployment because
it stimulates consumption is popular among union leaders, which often
advocate wage increases in order to lift the economy out of a slump18.
While such effect may exist, but only if workers save less than capitalists,
any positive effect on employment is bound to be short-lived, while the
long-term effects are likely to be negative. However, increasing wages
benefits incumbent employees, provided their jobs are protected enough,
regardless of its effect on aggregate consumption and employment.
18A typical example can be found in a txt from the French Union CGT, ”Sortir du bourbier
des bas salaires”, http://www.construction.cgt.fr/communication/tracts/tractsalaires.doc
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• The ”lump-of-labor” fallacy, which states that the total amount of work
is fixed and can only be shared among those who want to work, has led
to many misguided policies, such as pre-retirement to ”make room” for
the young, or working time reduction. These policies have been quite
prominent in France but also have had some impact in the Netherlands,
Germany, and Belgium. They are likely to have harmed employment,
as recently shown by Crépon and Kramarz (2002). Potentially, however,
some groups of workers may benefit, for example if such Malthusian poli-
cies shelter them from competition. While this remains much to be in-
vestigated, a theoretical analysis can be found in Marimon and Zilibotti
(2000).
• Another ideology is the general scepticism, among many analysts and
policy makers, about the allocative role of prices in general, and of wages in
particular. Dismissing the common sense view that less labor is demanded
when its price goes up amounts to dismissing all policies that would lead
to reductions in wages, or in the total cost of labor, in order to create
jobs. Such view may be supported by the difficulties one encounters when
estimating such effects, especially with aggregate data19; careful empirical
work, however, has made a rather convincing case that increases in labor
costs reduce employment20, at least when starting from levels as high as
those which prevail in European countries. The view that it does not,
however, remains popular in some places, and again it benefits workers
who are already employed and whose labor is substitute for the jobs that
would be created by such reductions in labor costs.
• People also tend to be more confident about the direct effects of policies
than about their indirect ones (Gersbach and Schniewind (2001)). While
the impact effect of a given policy is easy to figure out and uncontrover-
19See Card and Krueger (1995).
20Laroque and Salanié (2000, 2002).
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sial, its general equilibrium effects are more difficult to understand and
depend crucially on one’s views about the underlying functioning of the
economy. These views differ across people, and furthermore many voters
lack the cognitive ability to develop them, which leaves them vulnerable to
propaganda. If these effects are important, they will shape beliefs in ways
rarely friendly to employment-enhancing reforms. Thus, the direct effect
of a reduction in the minimum wage is to reduce the income of minimum
wage earners; subsequent job creation only come later. The direct effect of
reducing employment protection is that some workers will lose their jobs;
the benefits in terms of job creation come later, and hinge on the firms’
rational calculations taking into account the reduced cost of having to get
rid of a worker in the future; reductions in the generosity of unemployment
benefits impose ”hardship” on the unemployed, but their beneficial effects
on employment involve the complex process of wage bargaining; and so
on.
4.2.2 The logic: a labor demand example
To understand how ideology may interact with political economy, it is interesting
to illustrate these points with a simple example. Assume there are three cate-
gories of labor: skilled workers, for whom the labor market is perfectly competi-
tive; medium skilled workers, and low-skill workers. Assume the medium-skilled
workers are perfect substitutes for the low-skilled, but more productive. On the
other hand, the high skilled workers are complementary with these two factors
of production. Let us introduce a binding minimum wage w¯, so that the least
skilled are not fully employed. In equilibrium, their wage is precisely equal to
the minimum wage; At the same time, the medium-skilled’s wage will be larger,
since they are more productive, by a constant factor equal to the ratio between
their productivity and that of the unskilled. Finally, the minimum wage reduces
the wage of the high skilled, since firms use less of the complementary inputs in
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production.
Clearly, an increase in the minimum wage benefits the medium-skilled, since
their greater productivity guarantees that they remain at full employment21,
and their wage is a multiple of the minimum wage, because of substitutability
between them and the low-skilled. That is, a greater minimum wage increases
the medium-skilled’s income because it reduces competition between them and
the low-skilled.
On the other hand, an increase in the minimum wage unambiguously harms
the highly skilled, as the reduction in employment of the low-skilled, with whom
they are complementary, lowers their productivity.
What about the welfare of the low skilled? An increase in the minimum
wage raises the wage of those who are employed but increases the number of
those who are unemployed. Assume that, at the time society decides on the
level of the minimum wage, they do not know ex-ante whether they will be
employed or not. In order to figure out which level of the minimum wage they
favor, they will balance the marginal costs of a higher minimum wage in the
form of reduced employment probability, against its marginal benefits in terms
of higher wages for those who do find a job. Clearly, they are more likely to
favor a high minimum wage, the lower its negative effect on the probability of
being employed, i.e. the lower the elasticity of labor demand.
Suppose now that it is not known what the true parameters of the economy
are. The high-skilled do not need to know them in order to form their preferences
about a rise in the minimum wage, as they know they lose from it regardless of
the parameters; similarly, the medium skill know that they gain regardless of
the parameter, at least as long as one remains in the regime where some low-
skilled are employed. The low-skilled, however, cannot tell whether they gain
or lose absent any knowledge about the underlying parameters. Consequently,
to the extent that the low-skilled’s opinion matters to the actual policies that
21That is true as long as some low-skilled remain employed.
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are followed, it is in the interest of other groups to popularize views and the-
ories about the value of these parameters, regardless of whether those views
are rational or not. Thus, the medium skilled unconditionally benefit from the
general belief that the elasticity of the demand for unskilled workers is quite
low, or that wages play no allocative role, while the high skilled benefit from
the opposite views.
More fundamentally, a belief which is unlikely to be correct (relative to
possible alternative views) may be sustained if (i) the power to influence beliefs
is not distributed the same way as political power (otherwise one can directly
impose one’s preferred policies rather than influence other’s beliefs), (ii) the
preferred policies of those groups who have a relatively high influence on beliefs
is likely to be less responsive to knowledge about the economy’s true underling
parameters than the preferred policies of those groups who have a relatively
high influence on outcomes22 . Another key point is that a group need not know
whether or not an ideology is correct and at the same time may know that it
benefits from it.
One can think of a number of other plausible examples. For example, in
order to buy the support of skilled workers, unions may convey the view that
their policies redistribute between labor and capital, whereas in a world of inter-
national capital mobility they in fact redistribute between skilled and unskilled
workers.23
4.2.3 Influencing beliefs
An important, related question that the economic analysis of ideology should
then address is: by what means can a group manipulate the views of the low-
skilled in order to convince them one way or another about the net effects of a
minimum wage hike?
22 In a democracy, these groups would be voters, and those political parties or interest groups
that have a large impact on the media and the educational system, respectively.
23That example was suggested to me by Olivier Blanchard.
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One approach would be to believe that the low-skilled are rational Bayesian
learners, and therefore are updating their beliefs on the values of the para-
meters on the basis of observed economic outcomes. In such a case, one may
influence beliefs by manipulating either priors or posteriors. Manipulation of
posterior beliefs can take place by a group who controls the government. If the
low skilled’s prior is favorable to the group which controls the government (for
example if they believe in a low wage elasticity of unskilled labor demand and
if the medium-skilled control the government), the government can put noise in
the economy in order to slow the learning24. One way of doing so is to perturb
the demand for labor (via volatility in public expenditure, for example), so as to
prevent people from identifying economic parameters. This does not a priori re-
semble actual government practices. However, if we now consider that learning
may take place cross-sectionally, by comparing, say, different segments of the
labor market, then ”noise” can show up as complex labor market policies with
numerous special cases; in fact in many countries labor market regulations and
policies exhibit such unnecessary complexity. The general point is: social groups
who benefit from current priors gain from greater complexity to the extent that
it prevents or slows learning about the economy’s underlying parameters.
There is no consensus about how priors are formed, and when it comes
to influencing them it may be irrelevant whether agents are rational or not.
In both cases one has to know how beliefs are formed and why some beliefs
are more popular than others, on which little is known. But neuroscientists,
for example, have proved that statements that are often repeated tend to be
believed regardless of the rational basis for considering them as true25 . One
may then expect that the high-skilled and the medium-skilled would compete
with each other in sending repeated messages to the low-skilled, using the media
and the education system.
24Similar effects have been studied in a different context by Alesina and Cukierman (1990).
25 See Camerer et al (2003), Gilbert and Gill (2000).
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That beliefs that are unlikely to be grounded on knowledge of actual facts
may have a large impact on policy is substantiated by a recent paper by Postel-
Vinay and Saint-Martin (2003). Using socioeconomic surveys, they construct
synthetic indicators, for a number of European countries, of worker’s subjective
assessment of their degree of job security. They find that countries where work-
ers feel more insecure are countries where employment protection is stricter.
Thus causality seems to run from people’s perception to collective decisions
about the level of employment protection. In this particular case, it is unlikely
that differences in perceptions about job security originate in genuine differ-
ences in the underlying level of labour turnover. So it is possible that these
perceptions are supported by ideologies and views expressed in the media and
the educational system. To learn more about it, one would need to measure, for
example, the weight given by the media to job destruction episodes in highly
visible plants; the media’s attention may also be caught by spectacular actions
such as strikes, boycotts, etc.
Another piece of evidence is given by Blanchard and Philippon (2003), who
argue that the degree of trust between labor and capital, if measured by strike
activity, statistically explains part of the divergence between high and low un-
employment countries. When trust is not present, unions do not believe firm’s
statements about labor costs, the employment effects of wage increases, and so
on, and stick to their view of the world. Clearly, there is a two-way interaction
between trust and ideology: unions will not trust firms’ announcements if they
strongly believe in an ideology which contradicts them; and they are more likely
to believe an ideology that says that employment is unresponsive to labor costs
if they discard contrary views by firms they don’t trust.
Finally, let us point out that the methodological problems that plague social
sciences create an opacity that can be taken advantage of by interest groups in
order to promote their views. Since in most democracies, the public debate is
informed by "experts", whose views are reported in the media, that issue should
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not be under-estimated. Let us give two telling examples in the French context.
In the context of the debate over working-time reduction, the lump of labor
fallacy was repeatedly put forward, based on the casual observation that em-
ployment had remained constant throughout since 1975. Some politicians went
as far as saying that working time reduction should occur repeatedly to offset
secular productivity growth—that is, they moved from the ‘lump of labor’ to
the ‘lump of output’ fallacy. A large number of macroeconometric studies were
produced showing that working time reduction created a number of jobs during
a given number of years, on the basis of short-run Keynesian models that were
unsuitable for dealing with these kind of issues, given their very crude approach
to wage formation and aggregate supply (and, by construction, they predicted
a zero long-term effect of such policies on employment, hence a net reduction in
GDP per capita). The debate conveyed to the public the false impression that
”experts agreed that working-time reduction” created jobs.
In the other episode, which took place in 2000, unions at the statistical ad-
ministration protested against the publication in its journal, of an econometric
study by two leading economists, Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanié, which
showed that the French minimum wage destroyed jobs26 . They insisted that
there existed alternative studies pointing to an opposite conclusion, and pres-
sured the management of that administration to state publicly that it did not
endorse that study.27 That episode squares well with the above argument about
uncertainties regarding the elasticity of labor demand. It shows that interest
groups can intervene directly to manipulate the production and dissemination
of knowledge. To the extent that such process increases uncertainty about the
way the economy works, it also shows that these interest group’s preferences
are such that they benefit from that uncertainty. That is, knowing more is un-
likely to affect their own preferred policies, but may affect the decisive voter’s
26An english language version of their paper can be found in Laroque and Salanié (2002).
27The open letter sent by the unions (in French) can be read at the unions’ web site:
http://cgtinsee.free.fr/dossiers/etudes/Larosala.htm
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preferred policies in a way which is detrimental to them on average.
To summarize, different social groups want to influence beliefs in a way
favorable to them. The outcome will depend on the distribution of power among
those groups28, and there is thus no reason to expect the ”truer” views of the
world to prevail.
4.3 Agency
Another important issue is the existence of agency problems in implementing
government policies. Economists often tend to assume that they may be im-
plemented without obstacle as if the government were an integrated command
structure similar to an army. But it is in fact replete with agency problems,
in particular since in many countries the penalties that can be imposed on a
civil servant for inappropriate behavior are lower than in the private sector (due
to job security provisions, for example). Such agency problems are likely to
influence the outcome of reforms, in a way which may change our assessment of
which policies work and which don’t.
For example, there is a general agreement among economists that a tight
monitoring of the unemployed’s job search activity is desirable. This leads to
the following recommendation: rather than reduce social insurance by lowering
unemployment benefits, just tighten eligibility requirements and stop paying
benefits to those who turn down suitable jobs.
The problem is that the employment agency workers who are supposed to
implement such policies may well fail to do so because they consider the unem-
ployed, not the tax payer, as their clients. This is all too natural since it is the
unemployed with whom they are in contact on a daily basis and since, on the
other hand, there typically is no incentive mechanism for them to internalize
the government’s objective. It is all too easy, for example, to convince oneself
that a job offer was ”unsuitable” after all.
28 It is conceivable that a minority group which has no political power may nevertheless
command a privileged position in the media or in the educational system.
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